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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
  In Opalinski v. Robert Half International Inc., 761 
F.3d 326 (3d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1530 (2015), 
we held that the availability of class arbitration constitutes a 
“question of arbitrability” to be decided by the courts—and 
not the arbitrators—unless the parties’ arbitration agreement 
“clearly and unmistakably” provides otherwise, id. at 329, 
335-36. 
  
 Scout Petroleum, LLC and Scout II, LP (collectively, 
“Scout”) appeal from the orders of the United States District 
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania granting 
Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC’s (“Chesapeake”) motions for 
summary judgment and for an order vacating a decision by 
the arbitrators and denying Scout’s own motion to dismiss the 
complaint as well its motion for reconsideration.  The oil and 
gas leases (“Leases”) at issue in this appeal state that, in the 
event of a disagreement between “Lessor” and “Lessee” 
concerning “this Lease,” performance “thereunder,” or 
damages caused by “Lessee’s” operations, “all such disputes” 
shall be resolved by arbitration “in accordance with the rules 
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of the American Arbitration Association.”  (A247.)  Based on 
the language of the Leases themselves, the nature and 
contents of the various AAA rules, and the existing case law, 
we conclude that the Leases do not “clearly and 
unmistakably” delegate the question of class arbitrability to 
the arbitrators.  Accordingly, we will affirm. 
 
I. 
 
 In 2008, Chesapeake entered into various oil and gas 
leases with landowners in several northeastern Pennsylvania 
counties.  Chesapeake is the “Lessee,” and the “Lessor” is (or 
originally was) the respective landowner, e.g., “[t]his Lease 
made this 10th day of January, 2008, by and between:  
William D. Bergey and Joanne M. Bergey, husband and 
wife . . . hereinafter collectively called ‘Lessor’ and 
CHESAPEAKE APPALACHIA, L.L.C., an Oklahoma 
limited liability company . . . hereinafter called ‘Lessee.’”  
(A246.)  The Leases indicate that they were “prepared by” 
Chesapeake.  (A248.)  In 2013, Scout purchased the right to 
several Leases, and, since then, it has been receiving royalties 
from Chesapeake. 
  
 The Leases include the following arbitration provision: 
 
ARBITRATION.  In the event of a 
disagreement between Lessor and Lessee 
concerning this Lease, performance thereunder, 
or damages caused by Lessee’s operations, the 
resolution of all such disputes shall be 
determined by arbitration in accordance with 
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the rules of the American Arbitration 
Association.  All fees and costs associated with 
the arbitration shall be borne equally by Lessor 
and Lessee. 
 
(A247.) 
 
 Over the years, the AAA has adopted and amended 
several rules applicable to various kinds of arbitration and 
mediation proceedings.  Active Rules, American Arbitration 
Association, 
https://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/rules/searchrules/rulesearchres
ult?x_rule_status=A (last visited Nov. 10, 2015).  The AAA 
website lists more than fifty sets of active rules, including the 
Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures 
(“Commercial Rules”) as well as the Supplementary Rules for 
Class Arbitrations (“Supplementary Rules”).  Id. 
 
The AAA’s “Commercial Arbitration and Mediation 
Procedures” publication is nearly fifty pages long and 
includes fifty-eight different “Commercial Rules.”  These 
rules are couched in terms of individual or “bilateral” 
arbitration proceedings as opposed to proceedings on behalf 
of a class.  They also generally address basic procedural 
issues.  For example, there are rules governing the 
requirements for filing demands and answers, mediation, the 
arbitration proceeding’s locale, pre-hearing production of 
information, basic guidelines for how the hearing should be 
conducted, and the timing, form, and scope of the arbitrator’s 
award.  Commercial Rule 1 (“Agreement of Parties”) 
provides in relevant part that: 
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(a) The parties shall be deemed to have 
made these rules a part of their 
arbitration agreement whenever they 
have provided for arbitration by the 
American Arbitration Association 
(hereinafter AAA) under its Commercial 
Arbitration Rules or for arbitration by the 
AAA of a domestic commercial dispute 
without specifying particular rules.  
These rules and any amendment of them 
shall apply in the form in effect at the 
time the administrative requirements are 
met for a Demand for Arbitration or 
Submission Agreement received by the 
AAA.  Any disputes regarding which 
AAA rules shall apply shall be decided 
by the AAA.  The parties, by written 
agreement, may vary the procedures set 
forth in these rules.  After appointment 
of the arbitrator, such modifications may 
be made only with the consent of the 
arbitrator.  
 
(A93.)  Commercial Rule 7 governs the “Jurisdiction” of the 
arbitrator: 
 
(a) The arbitrator shall have the power to 
rule on his or her own jurisdiction, 
including any objections with respect to 
the existence, scope, or validity of the 
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arbitration agreement or to the 
arbitrability of any claim or 
counterclaim. 
 
(b) The arbitrator shall have the power to 
determine the existence or validity of a 
contract of which an arbitration clause 
forms a part.  Such an arbitration clause 
shall be treated as an agreement 
independent of the other terms of the 
contract.  A decision by the arbitrator 
that the contract is null and void shall not 
for that reason alone render invalid the 
arbitration clause. 
 
(c) A party must object to the jurisdiction of 
the arbitrator or to the arbitrability of a 
claim or counterclaim no later than the 
filing of the answering statement to the 
claim or counterclaim that gives rise to 
the objection.  The arbitrator may rule on 
such objections as a preliminary matter 
or as part of the final award. 
 
(A96.)  Commercial Rule 8 (“Interpretation and Application 
of Rules”) states, inter alia, that the arbitrator “shall interpret 
and apply these rules insofar as they relate to the arbitrator’s 
powers and duties.”  (A97.) 
 
 The Supplementary Rules governing class arbitration 
went into effect in 2003.  Entitled “Applicability,” 
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Supplementary Rule 1 states: 
 
(a)  These Supplementary Rules for Class 
Arbitrations (“Supplementary Rules”) shall 
apply to any dispute arising out of an agreement 
that provides for arbitration pursuant to any of 
the rules of the American Arbitration 
Association (“AAA”) where a party submits a 
dispute to arbitration on behalf of or against a 
class or purported class, and shall supplement 
any other applicable AAA rules.  These 
Supplementary Rules shall also apply whenever 
a court refers a matter pleaded as a class action 
to the AAA for administration, or when a party 
to a pending AAA arbitration asserts new 
claims on behalf of or against a class or 
purported class. 
 
(b)  Where inconsistencies exist between these 
Supplementary Rules and other AAA rules that 
apply to the dispute, these Supplementary Rules 
will govern.  The arbitrator shall have the 
authority to resolve any inconsistency between 
any agreement of the parties and these 
Supplementary Rules, and in doing so shall 
endeavor to avoid any prejudice to the interests 
of absent members of a class or purported class. 
 
(c)  Whenever a court has, by order, addressed 
and resolved any matter that would otherwise 
be decided by an arbitrator under these 
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Supplementary Rules, the arbitrator shall follow 
the order of the court.   
 
(A136.)  Supplementary Rule 3 is entitled “Construction of 
the Arbitration Clause”: 
 
Upon appointment, the arbitrator shall 
determine as a threshold matter, in a reasoned, 
partial final award on the construction of the 
arbitration clause, whether the applicable 
arbitration clause permits the arbitration to 
proceed on behalf of or against a class (the 
“Clause Construction Award”).  The arbitrator 
shall stay all proceedings following the issuance 
of the Clause Construction Award for a period 
of at least 30 days to permit any party to move a 
court of competent jurisdiction to confirm or to 
vacate the Clause Construction Award.  Once 
all parties inform the arbitrator in writing during 
the period of the stay that they do not intend to 
seek judicial review of the Clause Construction 
Award, or once the requisite time period expires 
without any party having informed the arbitrator 
that it has done so, the arbitrator may proceed 
with the arbitration on the basis stated in the 
Clause Construction Award.  If any party 
informs the arbitrator within the period 
provided that it has sought judicial review, the 
arbitrator may stay further proceedings, or some 
part of them, until the arbitrator is informed of 
the ruling of the court. 
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In construing the applicable arbitration clause, 
the arbitrator shall not consider the existence of 
these Supplementary Rules, or any other AAA 
rules, to be a factor either in favor of or against 
permitting the arbitration to proceed on a class 
basis. 
 
(A137.)  Under Supplementary Rule 4 (“Class 
Certification”), the arbitrator, if satisfied that the arbitration 
clause permits the arbitration to proceed as a class arbitration 
pursuant to Supplementary Rule 3, determines whether the 
proceeding should go forward as a class arbitration. 
 
 On March 17, 2014, Scout filed an arbitration demand 
against Chesapeake on behalf of itself and similarly situated 
lessors, alleging that Chesapeake paid insufficient royalties.  
In the answering statement it filed with the AAA, Chesapeake 
objected to class arbitration on the grounds that “[it] did not 
agree to resolve disputes arising out of the leases at issue in 
‘class arbitration,’ nor did Chesapeake agree to submit the 
question of class arbitrability -- i.e., whether claimants may 
proceed on a class basis in arbitration -- to an arbitrator.”  
(A1128.) 
 
 Chesapeake filed a declaratory judgment action on 
April 1, 2014.  It specifically sought a judgment declaring 
that:  (1) the District Court, and not the arbitrators, must 
decide whether class arbitration is available, which implicates 
the “who decides” question or inquiry; and (2) the Leases do 
not permit class arbitration, i.e., the so-called “clause 
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construction” inquiry.  Scout asked Judge Brann to reassign 
the case to Judge Mannion of the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania.  It claimed that Judge Mannion had already 
been assigned three related cases involving Chesapeake’s oil 
and gas leases, including Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C. v. 
Burkett.  This request was not granted.  Chesapeake moved 
for summary judgment on the “who decides” question, and 
Scout filed a motion to dismiss the complaint (or, in the 
alternative, for a stay pending the completion of the 
arbitration). 
 
 On July 30, 2014, we issued our opinion in Opalinski.  
According to the District Court, the Opalinski Court changed 
the state of the law in this Circuit by holding, “for the first 
time, that ‘the availability of classwide arbitration is a 
substantive “question of arbitrability” to be decided by a court 
absent clear agreement otherwise.’”  Chesapeake Appalachia, 
L.L.C. v. Scout Petroleum, LLC, 73 F. Supp. 3d 488, 499 
(M.D. Pa. 2014) (quoting Opalinski, 761 F.3d at 329). 
 
It appears that the parties had agreed to the 
appointment of three retired federal judges as the AAA 
arbitration panel.  On October 6, 2014, the arbitrators issued a 
decision entitled “CLAUSE CONSTRUCTION 
DECISION RE:  WHETHER A COURT OR THE 
PANEL MAY DECIDE CLASS ARBITRABILITY.”  
(A144.)  Although they expressed some skepticism about our 
opinion in Opalinski, the arbitrators purportedly applied our 
holding that class arbitrability constitutes a gateway question 
for the courts to decide unless there is a clear agreement to 
the contrary.  According to the arbitrators, “the arbitration 
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contract in this case clearly and unmistakably authorizes 
[them] to make the decision about arbitrability.”  (A149.)  
The arbitrators directed Scout and Chesapeake to brief the 
issue of whether the arbitration agreement precludes class 
arbitration. 
 
Chesapeake filed motions to vacate the arbitrators’ 
decision and to stay the arbitration proceeding until the 
District Court resolved Chesapeake’s motions.  The District 
Court entered an order on October 16, 2014, granting 
Chesapeake’s motion for summary judgment and its motion 
to vacate the arbitrators’ decision, denying Scout’s motion to 
dismiss, and denying as moot Chesapeake’s motion to stay.  
In particular, the District Court found the decision of the 
arbitrators “to be contrary to Opalinski.”  Chesapeake 
Appalachia, L.L.C. v. Scout Petroleum, LLC, No. 4:14-CV-
0620, 2014 WL 5370683, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 16, 2014).  
“The next day, Judge Mannion of the Middle District entered 
an opinion concerning the same legal questions presented to 
the Court below, and under the same Chesapeake lease 
arbitration language, but reached the opposite result to the 
October 16, 2014 Order.”1  (Appellants’ Brief at 8 (citing 
Chesapeake Appalachia LLC v. Burkett, Civil Action No. 
                                                 
1  Chesapeake appealed from Judge Mannion’s order 
(No. 14-4311).  It appears that the parties in Burkett have 
reached a settlement in connection with another proceeding 
pending in the Middle District of Pennsylvania (Demchak 
Partners Ltd. P’ship v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C.).  The 
Burkett appeal has been held in abeyance pending judicial 
approval of this settlement.  
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3:13-3073, 2014 WL 5312829 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 17, 2014)).)  
Scout filed a motion for reconsideration.  It also moved to 
recuse Judge Brann and to vacate the October 16, 2014 order.  
On December 10, 2014, the District Court heard oral 
argument on these motions. 
 
In a December 19, 2014 order, the District Court 
denied Scout’s motions and amended its October 16, 2014 
order to incorporate the District Court’s memorandum 
opinion “issued today’s date as the reasoning in support of 
that Order.”  (A36.)  The District Court also certified this 
matter for appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and stayed 
the action pending appeal. 
 
In its memorandum opinion, the District Court 
concluded that “[t]he contract here is silent or ambiguous as 
to class arbitration, far from the ‘clear and unmistakable’ 
allowance needed for an arbitrator, and not a court, to turn to 
the clause construction question.”  Scout, 73 F. Supp. 3d at 
501.  In reaching this conclusion, it relied in particular on this 
Court’s opinion in Opalinski as well as the Sixth Circuit’s 
decision in Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Crockett, 734 F.3d 594 (6th 
Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2291 (2014).  Judge Brann 
further explained that the approach adopted by Judge 
Mannion in Burkett “is not in accord with existing and 
binding case law.”  Scout, 73 F. Supp. 3d at 500. 
 
 On December 24, 2014, Scout filed a petition for 
permission to appeal under § 1292(b).  This Court granted its 
petition on January 21, 2015.  On March 4, 2015, Judge 
Keeley of the United States District Court for the Northern 
14 
 
District of West Virginia concluded in Chesapeake 
Appalachia, LLC v. Suppa, 91 F. Supp. 3d 853 (N.D. W. Va. 
2015), that “[the court], not an arbitrator, will decide whether 
the parties agreed to classwide arbitration in the subject 
leases,” id. at 864.  In another Chesapeake oil and gas lease 
case, Northern District of West Virginia Judge Stamp reached 
the same conclusion.  Bird v. Turner, Civil Action No. 
5:14CV97, 2015 WL 5168575, at *7-*9 (N.D. W. Va. Sept. 
1, 2015), appeal filed, No. 15-2152 (4th Cir. Sept. 30, 2015). 
 
II. 
 
 The District Court possessed diversity jurisdiction over 
this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.2  This Court has 
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to § 1292(b) and 9 U.S.C. § 
16. 
 
 We review de novo the District Court’s orders granting 
                                                 
2  Chesapeake and Scout Petroleum are limited liability 
companies, while Scout Petroleum II is organized as a limited 
partnership.  We asked the parties to submit affidavits setting 
forth the citizenship of their respective members and partners.  
See, e.g., Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co. v. Wood, 592 F.3d 
412, 420 (3d Cir. 2010) (stating that citizenship of limited 
liability company is determined by citizenship of its 
members); Swiger v. Allegheny Energy, Inc., 540 F.3d 179, 
184-85 (3d Cir. 2008) (stating that citizenship of limited 
partnership is determined by citizenship of partners).  In light 
of these sworn statements, we find that complete diversity 
exists in this matter.     
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Chesapeake’s summary judgment motion and its motion to 
vacate the arbitrators’ decision and denying Scout’s motion to 
dismiss the complaint.  See, e.g., Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. 
Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 265 (3d Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom. 
Allston v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 135 S. Ct. 1738 (2015); 
Opalinski, 761 F.3d at 330; Eid v. Thompson, 740 F.3d 118, 
122 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 175 (2014).  Its order 
denying Scout’s motion for reconsideration is reviewed for 
abuse of discretion.  See, e.g., N. River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA 
Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1203 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 
III. 
 
 Although enacted by Congress ninety years ago, the 
meaning and effects of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) 
continue to generate a great deal of controversy.  Arbitration 
clauses are included in a wide variety of contracts, including 
consumer contracts, employment agreements, and oil and gas 
leases.  In turn, it often must be decided whether class 
arbitration is available under the parties’ arbitration 
agreement.  In this appeal, we must determine “who” is to 
decide if the Leases permit class arbitration:  the courts or the 
arbitrators. 
     
 The availability of class arbitration implicates two 
questions or inquiries:  (1) the “who decides” inquiry; and (2) 
the “clause construction” inquiry.  As we recently explained 
in Opalinski, the “who decides” inquiry, in turn, consists of 
two basic components: 
 
The analysis is twofold.  We decide whether the 
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availability of classwide arbitration is a 
“question of arbitrability.”  See Howsam v. 
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., [537 U.S. 79, 83] 
(2002) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  If yes, it is presumed that the issue is 
“for judicial determination unless the parties 
clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise.”  
Id. (internal quotation marks, citations, and 
alteration omitted). If the availability of 
classwide arbitration is not a “question of 
arbitrability,” it is presumptively for the 
arbitrator to resolve.  See First Options of Chi., 
Inc. v. Kaplan, [514 U.S. 938, 944-45] (1994). 
 
Opalinski, 761 F.3d at 330.  In the “clause construction” 
inquiry, the court or the arbitrator then decides whether the 
parties’ arbitration agreement permits class arbitration.  It is 
undisputed that Opalinski held “that the availability of 
classwide arbitration is a substantive ‘question of 
arbitrability’ to be decided by a court absent clear agreement 
otherwise.”  Id. at 329.  However, the parties vigorously 
dispute whether or not the Leases clearly and unmistakably 
delegate this “question of class arbitrability” to the arbitrators. 
 
 “The burden of overcoming the presumption is 
onerous, as it requires express contractual language 
unambiguously delegating the question of arbitrability to the 
arbitrator.”  Id. at 335 (citing Major League Umpires Ass’n v. 
Am. League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 357 F.3d 272, 280-81 
(3d Cir. 2004)).  Scout’s entire approach can be summarized 
in the following terms:  (1) the Leases expressly state that the 
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arbitration will be conducted in accordance with “the rules of 
the American Arbitration Association;” (2) under 
Pennsylvania law, the arbitration clause incorporates all of the 
AAA rules into the Leases, which “are part of the parties’ 
agreement as if fully printed in haec verba therein” 
(Appellants’ Brief at 27); and (3) the Commercial and 
Supplementary Rules, as integral parts of the Leases, thereby 
clearly and unmistakably vest the arbitrators with the 
jurisdiction to decide the question of class arbitrability.  
However, we agree with the District Court and Chesapeake 
that the Leases fail to satisfy this “onerous” burden. 
   
 Given the actual language of the Leases themselves, 
the nature and terms of the various AAA rules, and the 
existing case law, we determine that the District Court was 
correct when it concluded that the Leases are “far from the 
‘clear and unmistakable’ allowance needed for” the 
arbitrators to decide the question of class arbitrability.  Scout, 
73 F. Supp. 3d at 501.  We acknowledge that Scout offers one 
reasonable interpretation of the Leases.  As a sophisticated 
business, Chesapeake could have (and, at least in retrospect, 
should have) drafted a clearer arbitration agreement.  
Nevertheless, it is not our role to ascertain whether one, 
among various competing interpretations of an arbitration 
agreement, is reasonable under ordinary principles of 
contractual interpretation, assess whether in hindsight a better 
arbitration agreement could have been written, or determine 
whether the arbitrators possess the power to decide other 
questions of arbitrability.  Instead, the Court must determine 
whether the Leases clearly and unmistakably delegate the 
specific question of class arbitrability to the arbitrators.  We 
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conclude that the Leases do not meet such an onerous burden. 
 
A. Prior Case Law  
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 While it has split the district courts,3 only two circuit 
                                                 
3  On the one hand, the Suppa court adopted (and 
expanded on) the District Court’s reasoning in this case to 
conclude that “Chesapeake and the Defendants did not clearly 
and unmistakably agree to arbitrate the issue of class 
arbitrability.”  Suppa, 91 F. Supp. 3d at 864.  In Bird, the 
district court, having considered the Chesapeake lease and its 
reference to the AAA rules, was “unconvinced that the parties 
intended to submit to the arbitrator the question of whether 
class arbitration is available.”  Bird, 2015 WL 5168575, at *9.  
There are additional decisions from district courts in this 
Circuit indicating that arbitration agreements referring to the 
AAA rules did not clearly and unmistakably delegate the 
question of class arbitrability to the arbitrators.  See Herzfeld 
v. 1416 Chancellor, Inc., Civil Action No. 14-4966, 2015 WL 
4480829, at *5-*6 (E.D. Pa. Jul. 22, 2015), appeal filed, No. 
15-2835 (3d Cir. Aug. 5, 2015); Chassen v. Fidelity Nat’l 
Fin., Inc., Civil Action No. 09-291 (PGS) (DEA), 2014 WL 
202763, at *6 (D.N.J. Jan. 17, 2014).  On the other hand, 
Scout cites to a number of district court decisions (including 
Judge Mannion’s opinion in Burkett) holding that such 
arbitration agreements did satisfy this “clear and 
unmistakable” standard.  See Marriott Ownership Resorts, 
Inc. v. Sterman, Case No: 6:14-cv-1400-ORL-41TBS, at 5-10 
(M.D. Fla. Jan. 16, 2015); Marriott Ownership Resorts, Inc. v. 
Flynn, Civil No. 14-00372 JMS-RLP, 2014 WL 7076827, at 
*7-*15 (D. Haw. Dec. 11, 2014); Burkett, 2014 WL 5312829, 
at *1-*9; Medicine Shoppe Int’l, Inc. v. Edlucy, Inc., No. 
4:12-CV-161 CAS, 2012 WL 1672489, at *1-*5 (E.D. Mo. 
May 15, 2012); Bergman v. Spruce Peak Realty, LLC, No. 
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courts have had the opportunity to consider the specific issue 
of whether an arbitration agreement referring to the AAA 
rules clearly and unmistakably delegated the question of class 
arbitrability to the arbitrators:  (1) this Court in Opalinski; and 
(2) the Sixth Circuit in Reed Elsevier (and Huffman v. Hilltop 
Cos., 747 F.3d 391 (6th Cir. 2014)).  While the Sixth Circuit 
indicated that such an agreement failed to meet this “clear and 
unmistakable” standard, our opinion in Opalinski did not 
address the effect of a reference to the AAA rules on this 
question.  However, we did emphasize the onerous nature of 
overcoming the presumption in favor of judicial resolution of 
such questions of arbitrability—which requires express and 
unambiguous contractual language of delegation as opposed 
to mere silence or ambiguous contractual language. 
 
 Like this Court, the Sixth Circuit initially held that the 
question of whether an arbitration agreement permits class 
arbitration constitutes a gateway matter reserved for judicial 
resolution unless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide 
otherwise.  Reed Elsevier, 734 F.3d at 597-99.  “[G]uid[ed]” 
by Reed Elsevier’s “persuasive” analysis, Opalinski, 761 F.3d 
at 334, we joined the Sixth Circuit in holding that the 
availability of class arbitration constitutes a question of 
arbitrability, id. at 335.  The arbitration clause at issue in 
Reed Elsevier provided that any controversy, claim, or 
counterclaim arising out of or connected with the parties’ 
contract will be resolved by binding arbitration under the 
                                                                                                             
2:11-CV-127, 2011 WL 5523329, at *2-*4 (D. Vt. Nov. 14, 
2011); Yahoo! Inc. v. Iverson, 836 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 1010-12 
(N.D. Cal. 2011).  
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arbitration provision and “‘the then-current Commercial 
Rules and supervision of the American Arbitration 
Association.’”  Reed Elsevier, 734 F.3d at 599.  According to 
the Sixth Circuit, this language “does not clearly and 
unmistakably assign to an arbitrator the question whether the 
agreement permits classwide arbitration.”  Id.  “Instead it 
does not mention classwide arbitration at all.”  Id.  While it 
could be argued that the question of class arbitrability 
constituted a controversy arising in connection with the 
contract, the agreement—given the complete absence of any 
reference to class arbitration—“can just as easily be read to 
speak only to issues related to bilateral arbitration.”   Id.  
“Thus, at best, the agreement is silent or ambiguous as to 
whether an arbitrator should determine the question of 
classwide arbitrability; and that is not enough to wrest that 
decision from the courts.”  Id. (citing Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. 
AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 684-85 (2010)).  The 
Reed Elsevier court then conducted a “clause construction” 
analysis, concluding that the arbitration agreement did not 
provide for class arbitration.  Id. at 599-600. 
 
 In Huffman, the Sixth Circuit applied the approach it 
set out in Reed Elsevier to an arbitration agreement providing 
for arbitration in accordance with the Commercial Rules as 
well as the AAA’s Optional Procedures for Large, Complex 
Commercial Disputes.  Huffman, 747 F.3d at 398.  “The 
plaintiffs concede that Reed Elsevier is controlling authority.  
As was the case in Reed Elsevier, here the parties’ agreement 
is silent as to whether an arbitrator or a court should 
determine the question of classwide arbitrability, meaning the 
determination lies with this court.  See [Reed Elsevier, 734 
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F.3d at 599].”  Huffman, 747 F.3d at 398. 
 
 Appellees Opalinski and McCabe filed a putative class 
action against their former employer, Appellant Robert Half 
International, Inc. (“RHI”), under the Fair Labor Standards 
Act.  Opalinski, 761 F.3d at 329.  The Opalinski Appellees’ 
employment agreements included arbitration clauses stating 
that “‘[a]ny dispute or claim arising out of or relating to 
Employee’s employment, termination of employment or any 
provision of this Agreement’ shall be submitted to 
arbitration.”  Id.  According to our opinion, “[n]either 
agreement mentions classwide arbitration.”  Id.  RHI moved 
to compel arbitration on an individual basis, and the district 
court, although it compelled arbitration, held that the 
propriety of classwide arbitration was to be decided by the 
arbitrator.  Id.  The arbitrator determined in a partial award 
that the employment agreements permitted class arbitration.  
Id.  The district court denied RHI’s motion to vacate the 
partial award.  Id. 
 
 In Opalinski, “the question before us [was] who 
decides—that is, should the availability of classwide 
arbitration have been decided by the arbitrator or by the 
District Court?”  Id.  In other words, we considered “whether, 
in the context of an otherwise silent contract, the availability 
of classwide arbitration is to be decided by a court rather than 
an arbitrator.”  Id. at 330.  Concluding that the district court 
must decide this question, we reversed the district court’s 
orders and remanded for the district court to determine 
whether the employment agreements called for class 
arbitration.  Id. at 335.         
23 
 
 The Court recognized that, even though federal policy 
favors arbitration agreements, arbitration remains a matter of 
contract.  Id. at 331.  Because parties cannot be compelled to 
arbitrate any dispute they have not agreed to submit to 
arbitration, arbitrators possess the power to decide an issue 
only if the parties have authorized the arbitrator to do so.  Id.  
“Because parties frequently disagree whether a particular 
dispute is arbitrable, courts play a limited threshold role in 
determining ‘whether the parties have submitted a particular 
dispute to arbitration, i.e., the “question of arbitrability.”’”  
Id. (quoting Howsam, 537 U.S. at 83).  Questions of 
arbitrability are limited to a narrow range of gateway issues, 
including whether the parties are bound by a given arbitration 
clause and whether an arbitration agreement applies to a 
particular type of controversy.  Id. at 331.  Questions that the 
parties would likely expect the arbitrator to decide are not 
questions of arbitrability.  Id.  These include procedural issues 
that grow out of the dispute and bear on the final disposition 
of the proceeding as well as allegations of waiver, delay, or 
similar defenses.  Id.   After a review of the prior Supreme 
Court and Third Circuit case law, we observed that whether 
the availability of class arbitration is a question of 
arbitrability “remains an open question.”  Id. at 332. 
 
 We held that the availability of classwide arbitration 
constitutes a question of arbitrability because it implicates 
“whose claims the arbitrator may adjudicate” as well as “what 
types of controversies the arbitrator may decide.”  Id.  We 
emphasized the fundamental differences between bilateral 
and class arbitration and the serious consequences that arise 
from proceeding with one type rather than the other.  Id. at 
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332-34.  We also turned for support to the Sixth Circuit’s 
ruling in Reed Elsevier, “[t]he only other Circuit Court of 
Appeals to have squarely resolved the ‘who decides’ issue.”  
Id. at 334.  We found its analysis to be “persuasive” and 
stated that it “guides our own.”  Id.  Accordingly, this Court 
joined the Sixth Circuit in holding that the availability of 
class arbitration constitutes a question of arbitrability.  Id. at 
335. 
 
   The Opalinski Court then determined that (in the 
words of the accompanying heading) “[t]here is no evidence 
rebutting the presumption that the District Court should 
decide all questions of arbitrability.”  Id. (emphasis omitted).  
This section of our opinion consisted of two paragraphs.  
First, we explained why we made this determination: 
 
 It is presumed that courts must decide 
questions of arbitrability “unless the parties 
clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise.”  
Howsam, [537 U.S. at 83] (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted).  The burden of 
overcoming the presumption is onerous, as it 
requires express contractual language 
unambiguously delegating the question of 
arbitrability to the arbitrator.  See [Major 
League Umpires], 357 F.3d at 280-81.  Silence 
or ambiguous contractual language is 
insufficient to rebut the presumption.  Gen. 
Elec. Co. v. Deutz AG, 270 F.3d 144, 154-55 
(3d Cir. 2001).  Here, Opalinski and McCabe’s 
employment agreements provide for arbitration 
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of any dispute or claim arising out of or relating 
to their employment but are silent as to the 
availability of classwide arbitration or whether 
the question should be submitted to the 
arbitrator.  Nothing else in the agreements or 
record suggests that the parties agreed to submit 
questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator.  Thus, 
the strong presumption favoring judicial 
resolution of questions of arbitrability is not 
undone, and the District Court had to decide 
whether the arbitration agreements permitted 
classwide arbitration. 
 
Id. at 335.  In the next paragraph, we stated that the district 
court’s orders were reversed and that the case was remanded 
for the district court to determine whether the employment 
agreements called for class arbitration.  Id. 
 
 In the end, we offered the following conclusion: 
 
 “Arbitration is fundamentally a creature 
of contract, and an arbitrator’s authority is 
derived from an agreement to arbitrate.”  [Puleo 
v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 605 F.3d 172, 194 
(3d Cir. 2010) (en banc)] (alteration in original) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  
Here, where we have an agreement to arbitrate 
individual disputes and no mention of 
arbitration for a wider group, we believe the 
parties would have expected a court, not an 
arbitrator, to determine the availability of class 
26 
 
arbitration.  This is especially so given the 
critical differences between individual and class 
arbitration and the significant consequences of 
that determination for both whose claims are 
subject to arbitration and the type of 
controversy to be arbitrated.  Hence we hold 
that the availability of class arbitration is a 
“question of arbitrability” for a court to decide 
unless the parties unmistakably provide 
otherwise. 
 
Id. at 335-36. 
 
 Because Opalinski did not address the impact of 
incorporating the AAA rules, it is not binding Circuit 
precedent disposing of the issue of whether an arbitration 
agreement referring to the AAA rules clearly and 
unmistakably delegated the question of class arbitrability to 
the arbitrators.  According to Chesapeake, “[t]his Court 
decided this very question (i.e., ‘who decides’ class 
arbitrability) on the same material facts (i.e., arbitration 
clauses incorporating the rules of the AAA but silent on class 
arbitration) and held that in these circumstances, courts, not 
arbitrators, decide class arbitrability.”  (Appellee’s Brief at 
12-13.)  However, the Opalinski Appellees did not raise any 
kind of “incorporation” argument—at least until after we 
issued our opinion.  In their unsuccessful petition for 
rehearing en banc, the Opalinski Appellees argued that the 
incorporation of the AAA rules constituted a clear and 
unmistakable expression of the parties’ intent to leave the 
question of arbitrability to the arbitrator.  Plaintiff-Appellees’ 
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Petition for Re-Hearing En Banc at 9 & n.5, Opalinski, 761 
F.3d 326 (No. 12-4444).  But, by then, it was too late.4  See, 
e.g., Peter v. Hess Oil V.I. Corp., 910 F.2d 1179, 1181 (3d 
Cir. 1990) (refusing to consider argument raised in rehearing 
petition but not in appellate briefing where no legitimate 
excuse was provided for failing to raise argument in timely 
fashion). 
 
 Nevertheless, we did hold (based in part on the Sixth 
Circuit’s own ruling in Reed Elsevier) “that the availability of 
classwide arbitration is a substantive ‘question of 
arbitrability’ to be decided by a court absent clear agreement 
otherwise.”  Opalinski, 761 F.3d at 329.  The Opalinski Court 
explained that “[t]he burden of overcoming the presumption 
is onerous, as it requires express contractual language 
unambiguously delegating the question of arbitrability to the 
arbitrator.”  Id. at 335 (citing Major League Umpires, 357 
F.3d at 280-81).  Accordingly, “[s]ilence or ambiguous 
contractual language is insufficient to rebut the presumption.”  
                                                 
4  The Opalinski Appellees subsequently addressed this 
“incorporation by reference” issue in their certiorari petition.  
See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 3 & n.2, Opalinski, 135 
S. Ct. 1530 (No. 14-625).  However, according to RHI, 
“Plaintiffs never argued the AAA incorporation issue in either 
the district court or before the Third Circuit,” and they 
thereby waived the right to seek certiorari as to that issue.  
Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 19, 
Opalinski, 135 S. Ct. 1530 (No. 14-625).  In any event, the 
Supreme Court denied the petition.  See Opalinski, 135 S. Ct. 
1530. 
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Id. (citing Deutz AG, 270 F.3d at 154-55).  We now must 
decide whether the Leases at issue in this appeal really satisfy 
this onerous burden. 
 
B. The Leases and the AAA Rules 
 
 Having considered the language of the Leases, the 
nature and contents of the various AAA Rules, and the prior 
case law, we conclude that the Leases do not satisfy the 
onerous burden of overcoming the presumption in favoring of 
judicial resolution of the question of class arbitrability. 
 
 We look to the actual language of the Leases, setting 
aside for the moment Scout’s “incorporation by reference” 
theory.  We find that the Leases are, at least in a certain sense, 
“silent as to the availability of classwide arbitration or 
whether the question should be submitted to the arbitrator.”  
Opalinski, 761 F.3d at 335.  Like the arbitration agreements at 
issue in cases like Opalinski and Reed Elsevier, the Leases do 
not expressly mention class arbitration, the availability of 
class arbitration, the Supplementary Rules, “who decides”—
the courts or the arbitrators—questions of arbitrability, or 
whether the arbitrators are to decide the availability of class 
arbitration under the Leases.  Id.; see also Reed Elsevier, 734 
F.3d at 599 (“This language does not clearly and 
unmistakably assign to an arbitrator the question whether the 
agreement permits classwide arbitration.  Instead it does not 
mention classwide arbitration at all.”); Bird, 2015 WL 
5168575, at *9 (“The agreement does not mention class 
arbitration or arbitrability.”); Herzfeld, 2015 WL 4480829, at 
*5 (“Here, the arbitration clause did not mention class or 
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collective action resolution.”); Suppa, 91 F. Supp. 3d at 862 
(“Like the arbitration clause in this case, however, [the clause 
in Opalinski] was silent with respect to class arbitration.”). 
 
 We agree with Scout that, in order to undo the 
presumption in favor of judicial resolution, an arbitration 
agreement need not include any special “incantation” (like, 
for example, “the arbitrators shall decide the question of class 
arbitrability” or “the arbitrators shall decide all questions of 
arbitrability”).  It appears that the concept of “silence” was 
first used in the “clause construction” context.  In Stolt-
Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., 559 U.S. 
662 (2010), the parties “stipulated that the arbitration clause 
was ‘silent’ with respect to class arbitration,” id. at 668.  
“Counsel for AnimalFeeds explained to the arbitration panel 
that the term ‘silent’ did not simply mean that the clause 
made no express reference to class arbitration.  Rather, he 
said, ‘[a]ll the parties agree that when a contract is silent on 
an issue there’s been no agreement that has been reached on 
that issue.’”  Id. at 668-69 (citation omitted); see also, e.g., 
Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2069 
(2013) (“The parties in Stolt-Nielsen had entered into an 
unusual stipulation that they had never reached an agreement 
on class arbitration.” (citing Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 668-
69)).  In our opinion in Sutter v. Oxford Health Plans LLC, 
675 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2012), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 2064 (2013), 
we explained that “Stolt-Nielsen did not establish a bright line 
rule that class arbitration is allowed only under an arbitration 
agreement that incants ‘class arbitration’ or otherwise 
expressly provides for aggregate procedures,” id. at 222 
(citing Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1776 n.10; Jock v. Sterling 
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Jewelers Inc., 646 F.3d 113, 124 (2d Cir. 2011)).  Instead, the 
Supreme Court established a default rule under which a party 
may not be compelled to submit to class arbitration unless 
there is a contractual basis to conclude that the party actually 
agreed to do so.  Id.; see also, e.g., Oxford Health Plans, 133 
S. Ct. at 2070 (“Nor, we continued, did the panel attempt to 
ascertain whether federal or state law established a ‘default 
rule’ to take effect absent an agreement.” (quoting Stolt-
Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 673)).  We also rejected the suggestion 
that an arbitration provision is “silent” whenever the words 
“class arbitration” are not written into the text of the 
provision itself.  Sutter, 675 F.3d at 222 n.5.  “[J]ust as ‘[t]he 
Supreme Court has never held that a class arbitration clause 
must explicitly mention that the parties agree to class 
arbitration in order for a decisionmaker to conclude that the 
parties consented to class arbitration, [Yahoo!, 836 F. Supp. 
2d at 1011],’” the parties’ failure to use a specific set of 
words does not automatically bar the courts from finding that 
the agreement clearly and unmistakably delegated the 
question of class arbitrability.  Burkett, 2014 WL 5312829, at 
*4. 
 
 Nevertheless, both the “who decides” and “clause 
construction” inquiries still impose basic standards that must 
be satisfied.  As a practical matter, the absence of an 
“incantation”—or the lack of any express reference to class 
arbitration, the availability of class arbitration, the 
Supplementary Rules, or who decides whether the arbitration 
agreement permits class arbitration—makes it more difficult 
to meet such burdens.  As we also recognized in Sutter, the 
requisite contractual basis may not be inferred solely from the 
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fact that the parties agreed to arbitrate or from their failure to 
prohibit this form of arbitration in their agreement.  Sutter, 
675 F.3d at 221, 224.  “‘[T]he differences between bilateral 
and class-action arbitration are too great for arbitrators to 
presume . . . that the parties’ mere silence on the issue of 
class-action arbitration constitutes consent to resolve their 
disputes in class proceedings.’”  Id. at 221 (quoting Stolt-
Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1776).  “It follows that the parties’ 
silence on the question of ‘who decides’ class arbitrability 
should not be read as implicitly consenting to submit the 
question to an arbitrator.”  Suppa, 91 F. Supp. 3d at 864.  In 
fact, the burden that must be met in the present “who decides” 
context appears even more “onerous” than the equivalent 
burden applicable to the “clause construction” phase.  After 
all, “[s]ilence or ambiguous contractual language” is not 
enough; the burden of overcoming the presumption “requires 
express contractual language unambiguously delegating the 
question of arbitrability to the arbitrator.”  Opalinski, 761 
F.3d at 335 (citations omitted). 
 
 “[G]iven the total absence of any reference to 
classwide arbitration,” the Leases “can just as easily be read 
to speak only to issues related to bilateral arbitration.”  Reed 
Elsevier, 734 F.3d at 599.  We find it significant that the 
Leases consistently use singular (and defined) terms to 
describe the respective parties to any arbitration proceeding 
and the dispute to be arbitrated.  The Leases provide that, 
where there is a disagreement between “Lessor” and “Lessee” 
concerning “this Lease,” performance “thereunder,” or 
damages caused by “Lessee’s” operations, “all such disputes” 
shall be resolved by arbitration “in accordance with the rules 
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of the American Arbitration Association.”  (A247.)  Each 
“Lease” defines the “Lessor” (e.g., “William D. Bergey and 
Joanne M. Bergey, husband and wife”) as well as the 
“Lessee” (“CHESAPEAKE APPALACHIA, L.L.C.”).  
(A246.)  According to Chesapeake, these terms clearly 
indicate that the parties only intended bilateral arbitration.  
While Chesapeake may have thereby intended to arbitrate all 
disagreements with each “Lessor,” the current inquiry 
implicates a putative class of “Lessors,” a group that (as the 
Suppa court noted) the Leases themselves never mention.  
Suppa, 91 F. Supp. 3d at 864. 
 
 Scout indicates that this language has no relevance to 
the present “who decides” inquiry.  While Chesapeake 
criticizes Scout for (as the District Court put it) “skip[ping] 
directly to the clause construction question in order to answer 
the threshold ‘who decides’ question,” Scout, 73 F. Supp. 3d 
at 500, Scout claims that it is Chesapeake and the District 
Court that have ventured into the “clause construction” 
inquiry.  We recognize that the “who decides” and the “clause 
construction” questions represent separate inquiries, and we 
do not express any opinion as to whether or not the Leases 
permit class arbitration.  However, the fact that specific 
terminology or a particular line of reasoning may be relevant 
to the “clause construction” inquiry (and we do not consider 
at this juncture how this inquiry should be conducted or its 
outcome) does not mean that this language or reasoning has 
no bearing whatsoever on the threshold “who decides” 
inquiry.  For example, Opalinski relied on the agreements’ 
“silen[ce] as to the availability of classwide arbitration” to 
conclude that the strong presumption favoring judicial 
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resolution of questions of arbitrability was not undone.  
Opalinski, 761 F.3d at 335; see also, e.g., Reed Elsevier, 734 
F.3d at 599 (“But given the total absence of any reference to 
classwide arbitration in this clause, the agreement here can 
just as easily be read to speak only to issues related to 
bilateral arbitration.”).  Scout also insists that, under Sutter, 
“the incantation of ‘class arbitration’ in an arbitration 
agreement is not necessary to permit class arbitration.”  
(Appellants’ Brief at 35 (citing Sutter, 675 F.3d at 222).)  
However, Sutter and Stolt-Nielsen were “clause construction” 
rulings.  See, e.g., Oxford Health Plans, 133 S. Ct. at 2068 n.2 
(“We would face a different issue if Oxford had argued below 
that the availability of class arbitration is a so-called ‘question 
of arbitrability.’”); Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 680 (“But we 
need not revisit that question here because the parties’ 
supplemental agreement expressly assigned this issue to the 
arbitration panel, and no party argues that this assignment 
was impermissible.”).  We nevertheless have looked to these 
“clause construction” cases for guidance in answering the 
“who decides” question.  We do the same with respect to 
other considerations relevant to the current inquiry, including 
express contractual language referring to a singular “Lessor,” 
“Lessee,” and “Lease.” 
 
 In light of the actual language of the Leases, Scout 
quite understandably emphasizes the contractual reference to 
arbitration “in accordance with the rules of the American 
Arbitration Association” (A247), the AAA rules, and the 
general contractual doctrine of incorporation by reference.  
Courts usually apply ordinary state law principles governing 
contract formation to decide whether the parties agree to 
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arbitrate a certain matter.  See, e.g., First Options, 514 U.S. at 
944.  It is uncontested that, under Pennsylvania law, 
“[i]ncorporation by reference is proper where the underlying 
contract makes clear reference to a separate document, the 
identity of the separate document may be ascertained, and 
incorporation of the document will not result in surprise or 
hardship.”  Std. Bent Glass Corp. v. Glassrobots Oy, 333 F.3d 
440, 447 (3d Cir. 2003) (footnote omitted). 
 
 Nevertheless, the general rule that courts should apply 
ordinary state law principles is subject to the following 
qualification: “Courts should not assume that the parties 
agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is ‘clea[r] and 
unmistakabl[e]’ evidence that they did so.”  First Options, 
514 U.S. at 944 (quoting AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns 
Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986)).  Accordingly, it is not 
enough for Scout to establish that the AAA rules provide for 
the arbitrators to decide, inter alia, the question of class 
arbitrability, and that, in turn, these rules are incorporated by 
reference pursuant to state law.  It instead must present “clear 
and unmistakable evidence” of an agreement to arbitrate this 
specific question.  As we explained in Opalinski, the onerous 
burden of overcoming the presumption requires express 
contractual language unambiguously delegating the 
question—not mere silence or ambiguous contractual 
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language.5  See, e.g., Opalinski, 761 F.3d at 335. 
 
 Scout argues that the reference in the Leases to “the 
rules of the American Arbitration Association” is express 
contractual language incorporating the content of the 
Commercial Rules and the Supplementary Rules into the 
contract and serves as a clear and unmistakable delegation of 
authority to the arbitrators to decide class arbitrability.  We, 
however, agree with Chesapeake that this case implicates “a 
daisy-chain of cross-references”—going from the Leases 
themselves to “the rules of the American Arbitration 
Association” to the Commercial Rules and, at last, to the 
Supplementary Rules.  (Appellees’ Brief at 31.)  Having 
examined the various AAA rules, we believe that the Leases 
still fail to satisfy the onerous burden of undoing the 
presumption in favor of judicial resolution of the question of 
class arbitrability.        
                                                 
5  Scout turns for support to the Supreme Court’s 
December 14, 2015 decision in DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, -
-- S. Ct. ---, 2015 WL 8546242 (2015).  The DIRECTV Court 
concluded that a California court’s refusal to enforce an 
arbitration agreement “does not rest ‘upon such grounds as 
exist . . . for the revocation of any contract.’”  Id. at *2 
(quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2).  The Supreme Court did not consider 
whether the parties’ agreement delegated a question of 
arbitrability to the arbitrators, and it did not call into question 
the well-established rule that courts should not assume that 
the parties agree to arbitrate arbitrability without “‘clear and 
unmistakbl[e]’ evidence that they did so.”  First Options, 514 
U.S. at 944 (quoting AT&T Techs., 475 U.S. at 649).   
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 Initially, the Leases simply refer, without further 
explanation, to “the rules of the American Arbitration 
Association.”  (A247.)  In other words, “[their] reference to 
the AAA rules is the only link to the submission of 
arbitrability issues to the arbitrator.”  Bird, 2015 WL 
5168575, at *9.  Founded in 1926, the AAA has adopted (and 
amended) numerous rules over many years.  The AAA 
website identifies more than fifty sets of rules.  Active Rules, 
supra.  These range from the “AAA Dispute Resolution 
Board Hearing Rules and Procedures” to the “Supplementary 
Rules for Fixed Time and Cost Construction Arbitration.”  Id.  
In turn, the Leases at issue in this case do not expressly refer 
to the specific “Supplementary Rules” governing class 
arbitrations or the general “Commercial Rules.”  See, e.g., 
Herzfeld, 2015 WL 4480829, at *6 (“[W]e cannot find the 
three-word reference to AAA ‘rules and regulations’ 
incorporates a panoply of collective and class action rules 
applied by AAA once the matter is properly before the 
arbitrators by consent or waiver.”). 
 
 While Commercial Rule 7 expressly grants the 
arbitrator the power to rule on objections concerning the 
arbitrability of any claim (and Commercial Rule 8 states that 
the arbitrator shall interpret and apply the rules insofar as they 
relate to the arbitrator’s powers and duties), the Commercial 
Rules do not mention either class arbitration or the question 
of class arbitrability.  The AAA’s “Commercial Rules and 
Mediation Procedures” publication is nearly fifty pages long 
and includes fifty-eight different “Commercial Rules.”  Like 
the Leases and their references to a singular “Lessor,” 
Lessee,” and “Lease,” these rules are couched in terms of 
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bilateral arbitration proceedings.  In addition, they address 
various procedural matters.  Commercial Rule 4, for example, 
governs “Filing Requirements,” e.g., “[a]rbitration under an 
arbitration provision in a contract shall be initiated by the 
initiating party (‘claimant’) filing with the AAA a Demand 
for Arbitration, the administrative filing fee, and a copy of the 
applicable arbitration agreement from the parties’ contract 
which provides for arbitration.”  (A94.)  Likewise, 
Commercial Rule 5 (“Answers and Counterclaims”) provides, 
inter alia, that “[a] respondent may file an answering 
statement with the AAA within 14 calendar days after notice 
of the filing of the Demand is sent by the AAA.”  (A95.)  The 
Commercial Rules also address, among other things, when 
mediation is required, the locale for the arbitration, pre-
hearing production of information, basic principles for how 
the hearing should be conducted, and the timing, form, and 
scope of the arbitrator’s award.  These are the basic 
procedural issues that, as we noted in Opalinski, “the parties 
would likely expect the arbitrator to decide.”  Opalinski, 761 
F.3d at 331 (citation omitted).  In contrast, the question of 
class arbitrability “is a substantive gateway question rather 
than a procedural one.”  Id. at 335. 
 
 Given the actual contractual language at issue here as 
well as the language and nature of the other AAA rules, the 
Supplementary Rules are not enough for us to conclude that 
the Leases clearly and unmistakably delegate the question of 
class arbitrability to the arbitrators.  Under Supplementary 
Rule 1, the Supplementary Rules apply where a party submits 
a dispute on behalf of a purported class, and Supplementary 
Rules 3 and 4 indicate that the arbitrator must determine 
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whether the arbitration agreement permits class arbitration.6  
But, before we can even consider these Supplementary Rules, 
the “daisy-chain” takes us from the Leases to the otherwise 
unspecified “rules of the American Arbitration Association” 
to the Commercial Rules.  The Commercial Rules do not even 
refer to the Supplementary Rules and are phrased in terms of 
basic procedural issues arising out of bilateral arbitration 
proceedings. 
 
 Because they are susceptible to more than one 
reasonable interpretation, the Leases do not include the 
                                                 
6  Chesapeake argues that Supplementary Rule 3 
refutes Scout’s argument because it states that, “[i]n 
construing the applicable arbitration clause, the arbitrator 
shall not consider the existence of these Supplementary 
Rules, or any other AAA rules, to be a factor either in favor 
of or against permitting the arbitration to proceed on a class 
basis.”  (A137.)  This aspect of the rule, however, implicates 
the “clause construction” inquiry.  While the Sixth Circuit 
relied on this language, it did so in order to determine 
whether the parties’ arbitration agreement authorized class 
arbitration (and not to answer the threshold “who decides” 
question).  See Reed Elsevier, 734 F.3d at 599-600 (“Crockett 
responds that the arbitration clause refers to the AAA’s 
Commercial Rules, which themselves incorporate the AAA’s 
Supplemental Rules for Class Arbitration.  But the 
Supplemental Rules expressly state that one should ‘not 
consider the existence of these Supplementary Rules, or any 
other AAA rules, to be a factor either in favor of or against 
permitting the arbitration to proceed on a class basis.’”). 
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required “express contractual language unambiguously 
delegating the question of [class] arbitrability to the 
arbitrator[s].”  Opalinski, 761 F.3d at 335 (citation omitted).   
While it is reasonable to interpret the Leases, together with 
the Commercial Rules (especially Commercial Rule 7) and 
the Supplementary Rules (specifically Supplementary Rule 
3), as granting the arbitrators the power to decide whether 
class arbitration is available, that is not the only reasonable 
interpretation.  For instance, what if we were to assume that a 
landowner and an energy company intended to delegate to the 
arbitrator questions of arbitrability arising out of a bilateral 
arbitration proceeding between these two parties (i.e., 
“questions of bilateral arbitrability”)—but not the question of 
class arbitrability?  Wouldn’t it be reasonable for the parties 
to draft an arbitration agreement that contains no reference 
whatsoever to class arbitration, the question of class 
arbitrability, or the Supplementary Rules but instead provides 
for arbitration “[i]n the event of a disagreement between 
Lessor and Lessee concerning this Lease” pursuant to “the 
rules of the American Arbitration Association”?  Or perhaps 
the parties simply intended for the courts to decide both 
questions of bilateral arbitrability as well as the question of 
class arbitrability, consistent with the general presumption in 
favor of judicial resolution of such questions? 
 
 According to Scout, Chesapeake is asking us to adopt 
an unprecedented approach that would be inconsistent with 
well-settled “incorporation” principles.  We acknowledge that 
it was Chesapeake that drafted the Leases.  As a sophisticated 
business, it could have, and, at least in retrospect, should 
have, drafted a clearer arbitration agreement.  However, we 
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must construe ambiguity against Scout and in Chesapeake’s 
favor because “[i]t is presumed that courts must decide 
questions of arbitrability ‘unless the parties clearly and 
unmistakably provide otherwise.’”  Id. (citation omitted). 
“The burden of overcoming the presumption is onerous[.]”  
Id. (citation omitted).  We cannot find that this onerous 
burden has been met merely because Chesapeake failed, for 
example, “to insert words of limitation or an express waiver 
of class arbitration” (Appellants’ Reply Brief at 15 (citations 
omitted)).  In fact, such a finding would (as the Suppa court 
aptly observed) “turn[ ] the presumption favoring judicial 
determination of classwide arbitrability on its head.”  Suppa, 
91 F. Supp. 3d at 864.  “The entire point of the presumption is 
that an arbitration clause need not expressly exclude 
questions of arbitrability as outside its scope . . . .”  Id. 
(citation omitted). 
 
 It appears that “[v]irtually every circuit to have 
considered the issue has determined that incorporation of the 
[AAA] arbitration rules constitutes clear and unmistakable 
evidence that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability.”  
Oracle Am., Inc. v. Myriad Grp. A.G., 724 F.3d 1069, 1074 
(9th Cir. 2013) (citing Petrofac, Inc. v. DynMcDermott 
Petroleum Operations Co., 687 F.3d 671, 675 (5th Cir. 2012); 
Fallo v. High-Tech Inst., 559 F.3d 874, 878 (8th Cir. 2009); 
Qualcomm Inc. v. Nokia Corp., 466 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. 
Cir. 2006); Terminix Int’l Co. v. Palmer Ranch LP, 432 F.3d 
1327, 1332 (11th Cir. 2005); Contec Corp. v. Remote 
Solution Co., 398 F.3d 205, 208 (2d Cir. 2005)).  Like the 
District Court and Chesapeake, however, we believe that this 
“bilateral arbitration dispute case law” is entitled to relatively 
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little weight in the class arbitrability context.  Scout, 73 F. 
Supp. 3d at 500.  Devoting several pages of its appellate 
briefing to these bilateral arbitration cases, Scout argues that 
the incorporation of the AAA rules constitutes clear and 
unmistakable evidence of intent to delegate authority to the 
arbitrators to decide all questions of arbitrability, including 
the specific question of class arbitrability.  However, the 
whole notion of class arbitration implicates a particular set of 
concerns that are absent in the bilateral context.  Although it 
ultimately chose to rely on these cases, the Burkett court 
admitted that “the above cases do not address the exact issue 
presented in this action,” i.e., “‘who decides’ class 
arbitrability.”  Burkett, 2014 WL 5312829, at *7 (footnote 
omitted) (citation omitted).  In concluding that the availability 
of class arbitration constitutes a question of arbitrability, we 
turned in Opalinski to Supreme Court rulings highlighting the 
fundamental differences between bilateral arbitration and 
class arbitration as well as the serious consequences of 
permitting a class arbitration proceeding to go forward: 
 
“[(1) a]n arbitrator . . . no longer resolves a 
single dispute between the parties to a single 
agreement, but instead resolves many disputes 
between hundreds or perhaps even thousands of 
parties . . . [; (2) ] the presumption of privacy 
and confidentiality that applies in many bilateral 
arbitrations [does] not apply in class 
arbitrations[,] thus potentially frustrating the 
parties’ assumptions when they agreed to 
arbitrate[; (3) t]he arbitrator’s award no longer 
purports to bind just the parties to a single 
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arbitration agreement, but adjudicates the rights 
of absent parties as well[; and (4) ] the 
commercial stakes of class-action arbitration are 
comparable to those of class-action litigation, 
even though the scope of judicial review is 
much more limited.” 
 
Opalinski, 761 F.3d at 333 (quoting Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 
686-87); see also, e.g., id. at 333 (“Additionally, as Justice 
Alito warned in his concurrence in Oxford Health, courts 
should be wary of concluding that the availability of 
classwide arbitration is for the arbitrator to decide, as that 
decision implicates the rights of absent class members 
without their consent.” (citing Oxford Health Plans, 133 S. 
Ct. at 2071-72 (Alito, J., concurring)).  “In AT&T Mobility 
LLC v. Concepcion, [131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011)], the Court 
similarly emphasized that the ‘changes brought about by the 
shift from bilateral arbitration to class-action arbitration are 
fundamental,’ concluding that ‘[a]rbitration is poorly suited to 
the higher stakes of class litigation’ and that classwide 
arbitration ‘is not arbitration as envisioned by the FAA.’”  
Opalinski, 761 F.3d at 333-34 (quoting Concepcion, 131 S. 
Ct. at 1750, 1751-53).  The legislative history of the FAA—
which predates the adoption of Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23, which governs class actions, by decades—
“contains nothing . . . that contemplates the existence of class 
arbitration.”  Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1749 n.5.  Given these 
considerations, it is conceivable that a landowner and energy 
company may have agreed to the Leases because they 
intended to delegate questions of bilateral arbitrability to the 
arbitrators—as opposed to the distinctive question of whether 
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they thereby agreed to a fundamentally different type of 
arbitration not originally envisioned by the FAA itself. 
 
 Like the Burkett court, Scout asserts that consent to 
any of the AAA’s rules constitutes consent to the 
Supplementary Rules and that, if a dispute subject to 
arbitration under these rules involves a purported class, the 
arbitration must be governed by all the rules, including the 
Supplementary Rules.  Burkett, 2014 WL 5312829, at *7.  In 
Reed v. Florida Metropolitan University, Inc., 681 F.3d 630 
(5th Cir. 2012), abrogated in part on other grounds, Oxford 
Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064 (2013), the Fifth 
Circuit refrained from deciding whether the issue of class 
arbitration constitutes a question of arbitrability, id. at 633-36.  
It did so because, among other things, it believed that “the 
parties’ agreement to the AAA’s Commercial Rules also 
constitutes consent to the Supplementary Rules,” id. at 635 
(footnote omitted), and, given the substance of 
Supplementary Rule 3, “[t]he parties’ consent to the 
Supplementary Rules, therefore, constitutes a clear agreement 
to allow the arbitrator to decide whether the party’s 
agreement provides for class arbitration,” id. at 635-36.  
However, we once again note that the current inquiry requires 
us to determine whether the Leases clearly and unmistakably 
delegate the question of class arbitrability to the arbitrators—
and not merely whether the parties have somehow 
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“consented” to the Supplementary Rules.7 
 
 Finally, we find it significant that the Sixth Circuit 
held that an agreement referring to the AAA rules did not 
meet the “clear and unmistakable” standard.  Admittedly, the 
Reed Elsevier court did not provide a detailed analysis in 
                                                 
7  Furthermore, it appears that the parties in Reed did 
not dispute the applicability of the Supplementary Rules.  
Reed, 681 F.3d at 635 n.5 (“The School, in its motion to 
vacate the clause construction award, in fact represented to 
the district court that it had agreed to those Rules.” (citation 
omitted)).  
 
In a footnote, the Eleventh Circuit also refrained from 
deciding whether the availability of class arbitration is a 
question of arbitrability because the appellant “gave the 
question of whether the contract allowed for class arbitration 
to the arbitrator through its choice of rules and by failing to 
‘dispute th[e] [a]rbitrator’s jurisdiction to decide this 
threshold issue.’”  Southern Commc’ns Servs., Inc. v. 
Thomas, 720 F.3d 1352, 1359 n.6 (11th Cir. 2013) (citation 
omitted), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1001 (2014).  The parties 
agreed to arbitration pursuant to the AAA’s Wireless Industry 
Arbitration Rules.  Id. at 1355.  Like the Fifth Circuit, the 
Eleventh Circuit did not reference the “onerous” burden that 
applies in the current context (and also relied on the party’s 
conduct in the proceeding).    
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support of its holding.8  See, e.g., Burkett, 2014 WL 5312829, 
at *7 (“Further, in considering the arbitration clause in Reed 
[Elsevier], the Sixth Circuit looked only to whether there was 
an express reference to class arbitration in the arbitration 
clause.”).  But, given our examination of both the language of 
the Leases and the nature and contents of the various AAA 
rules, we see no reason to reach a different conclusion in this 
case—and create a circuit split.  After all, we “join[ed] the 
                                                 
8  As Scout points out, the Reed Elsevier court did not 
quote from or expressly examine the various AAA rules until 
it conducted its “clause construction” analysis.  In fact, the 
court never specifically mentioned Commercial Rule 7.  
Scout further insists that the Sixth Circuit mischaracterized 
Supplementary Rule 3.  According to Scout, the circuit court 
overlooked the first sentence of the rule (which states that 
“the arbitrator” shall determine whether the arbitration clause 
permits the arbitration to proceed on behalf of a class) and 
misstates the final sentence of the rule (providing that, in 
construing the applicable arbitration clause, “the arbitrator” 
shall not consider the existence of the Supplementary Rules to 
be a factor either for or against permitting class arbitration).  
The Sixth Circuit observed that “the Supplemental Rules 
expressly state that one should ‘not consider the existence of 
these Supplementary Rules, or any other AAA rules, to be a 
factor either in favor of or against permitting the arbitration to 
proceed on a class basis.’”  Reed Elsevier, 734 F.3d at 599-
60.  We do not see how the Sixth Circuit’s use of the term 
“one” in place of “the arbitrator” in the “clause construction” 
context casts doubt on its prior determination that the 
question of class arbitrability must be decided by the court.    
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Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in holding that the availability 
of class arbitration is a ‘question of arbitrability.’”  Opalinski, 
761 F.3d at 335.  In this appeal, we likewise conclude that the 
Leases do “not clearly and unmistakably assign to an 
arbitrator the question whether the agreement permits 
classwide arbitration.”  Reed Elsevier, 734 F.3d at 599. 
 
C. The Relief Granted 
 
 The District Court granted Chesapeake’s motions for 
summary judgment and for the vacatur of the arbitrators’ 
decision and denied Scout’s motions to dismiss and for 
reconsideration.  Scout specifically contends that the District 
Court committed reversible error by vacating the arbitrators’ 
decision holding that the Leases clearly and unmistakably 
authorize them to decide the question of class arbitrability.  
Nevertheless, we have determined that the Leases do not 
clearly and unmistakably delegate this question to the 
arbitrators.  According to Scout, “the Supreme Court in 
[Oxford Health Plans] wrote that a court may review an 
arbitrator’s determination de novo only absent ‘clear and 
unmistakable’ evidence that the parties wanted an arbitrator 
to resolve the dispute.”  (Appellants’ Reply Brief at 18 (citing 
Oxford Health Plans, 133 S. Ct. at 2068 n.2; Appellees’ Brief 
at 12).)   Given the absence of “clear and unmistakable” 
evidence in this case, the District Court appropriately granted 
the motion to vacate. 
 
IV. 
  
 We will affirm the orders of the District Court. 
